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Comment

You Better Smile When You Say "Cheese!":
Whether the Photograph Requirement for
Drivers' Licenses Violates the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment

All fifty states require that a licensee's photograph be included on his
or her driver's license.' While many people willingly comply with the
photograph requirement and say "Cheese!" without complaint, the
photograph requirement presents an obstacle to others that may in fact
prevent them from obtaining valid drivers' licenses even though they are
otherwise qualified. The photograph requirement causes a problem
when an applicant for a driver's license has religious beliefs that forbid
the taking of his or her photograph. An applicant is faced with the
dilemma of following his or her religious beliefs or obtaining a valid
driver's license in both of the following situations: (1) when the applicant
adheres to a particular religion that prohibits the taking of his or her
photograph, or (2) when the applicant believes that being photographed
is against his or her religion even though this belief is not shared by
others. Recognizing this lose-lose choice that some people face, some
states-but not all-allow exceptions to the photograph requirement and

1.

Dennis v. Charnes (Dennis 11), 646 F. Supp. 158, 161 (D. Colo. 1986).
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issue valid drivers' licenses notwithstanding the fact that the licensees'
photographs are not taken.2
In some of the states that have not granted exceptions to the
photograph requirement for applicants with religious objections, courts
have addressed whether the photograph requirement violates the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution3 or their respective state constitutions.4 Some of these courts have
held that the challenged statutes are unconstitutional infringements into
the plaintiffs' free exercise of religion and have required that the states
grant exceptions to the plaintiffs who challenge them.5 Other courts
have upheld the challenged statutes after declaring that the states'
alleged interests should prevail over any intrusions the statutes make
into the plaintiffs' free exercise of religion.' When the court determines
whether to uphold the challenged statute, the context in which the case
is decided appears to be of extreme importance in explaining the
government's interest and whether such interest is sufficient to allow an
intrusion into the plaintiff's free exercise of religion. In particular, cases
decided since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September
11, 2001, focus on the identification purpose served by the photograph
requirement and how it aids airport security and prevents future
terrorist attacks.7 In light of these new found public safety concerns,
courts throughout the United States analyze cases decided after
September 11 differently from the cases decided before September 11.
In Section I, this Comment traces the rather complex history of the
Free Exercise Clause and explains the current law. In Section II, this
Comment discusses the cases from various jurisdictions throughout the
United States that have considered whether the photograph requirement
on drivers' licenses violates the Free Exercise Clause. In Section III, this
Comment considers the relevancy of the context in which the case is

2. See id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See, e.g., Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), affd per curiam sub
nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985); Dennis 11, 646 F. Supp. 158; Valov v. Dep't
of Motor Vehicles, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div.,
Dep't of Revenue, 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1979) (en banc); Freeman v. Dep't of Highway
Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Bureau of Motor Vehicles
v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. 1978).
5. See Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1128; Dennis II, 646 F. Supp. at 164; PentecostalHouse of
Prayer,Inc., 380 N.E.2d at 1229.
6. See Valov, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 183; Johnson, 593 P.2d at 1366; Freeman, 924 So. 2d
at 57.
7. See Valov, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 186-87; Freeman v. State, 2002-CA-2828, 2003 WL
21338619, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 6, 2003), affd sub nom. Freeman, 924 So. 2d 48.
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decided in explaining the government's interest and whether such
interest is sufficient to allow an intrusion into the plaintiff's free exercise
of religion. Of particular importance in Section III is a discussion of how
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, may have affected the
courts' evaluation of state interests in photographing licensees. In
Section IV, this Comment concludes with an analysis of the potential
impact of post-September 11 safety concerns on future cases involving
First Amendment challenges.
I.

HISTORY OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

A.

Extent of Application
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibitingthe free exercise thereof."' The emphasized clause, which is
the focus of this Comment's constitutional analysis, is commonly referred
to as the Free Exercise Clause.9 The United States Supreme Court
efficiently summarizes the protection provided by the Free Exercise
Clause as follows: "The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself
to religious tolerance, and ...[1legislators may not devise mechanisms,
overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its
practices."' 0 Importantly, the protection of the Free Exercise Clause
does not apply solely to acts of Congress (even though the Clause's
explicit language may cause one to think otherwise) because the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution" makes the
Clause applicable to state legislation as well.2 As a result, both
Congress and state legislatures are prohibited
from enacting legislation
13
that amounts to religious persecution.
In Reynolds v. United States, 4 the Supreme Court first considered
the impact of the Free Exercise Clause and whether it allows a person
to circumvent the established law on the basis that his or her religious
beliefs are contrary to what the law requires or forbids.' 5 While
discussing the extent to which the legislature may intrude into one's
religion, the Court noted that the legislature may interfere with religious

8. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
9. See id.
10. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,547 (1993).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
13. Id.
14. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
15. See id. at 162-67.
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practices but not religious beliefs.'" Therefore, one is free to believe
whatever he or she chooses, and the government cannot reward or
punish him or her for doing so.' 7 To protect society, however, the
government may regulate one's religious practices."8 Based on this
reasoning, the Court held that one violates the established law when he
or she does not comply with a law interfering with his or her religious
practices due to his or her religious beliefs. 9 To hold otherwise, the
Court believed, "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself."0
B.

Evolution of the Proper Test for Free Exercise Challenges

1. Sherbert v. Verner Introduction of the Strict Scrutiny Tbst.
In the cases following Reynolds, the Court considered whether challenged laws violated the Free Exercise Clause by unlawfully intruding
into religious beliefs but did not initially set forth an explicit test for
making such determinations. 2 In fact, the Court did not articulate a
specific test until 1963.22 During that year, in Sherbert v. Verner,23
the Court ruled that all laws allegedly violating the Free Exercise
Clause had to be analyzed under the strict scrutiny test.24 Under the
strict scrutiny test, laws substantially burdening the free exercise of
religion are upheld only if: (1) the government has a compelling interest
that the challenged law helps attain, and (2) there are no alternatives
to the challenged law that would intrude less into one's free exercise of
religion.'
In order to prevail under the strict scrutiny test, a plaintiff must first
plausibly assert that he or she objects to a law due to his or her religious

16. Id. at 166.
17. See id.
18.

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.

19. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
20. Id. at 167.
21.

ERwiN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1247 (3d ed.

2006).
22. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-08 (1963); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21,
at 1247-48.
23. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
24. Id. at 406-08 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
25. Id. (citing Collins, 323 U.S. at 530).
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beliefs.2" Next, he or she must show that enforcement of the challenged
law substantially burdens the free exercise of his or her religion.27
To make this showing, the plaintiff must first plausibly assert that he
or she has sincere religious beliefs.2" The first step of this inquiry is a
consideration of whether the plaintiff's beliefs are religious.29 "Although a religious belief requires something more than a purely secular
philosophical or personal belief, courts have approved an expansive
definition of religion."30 The second step of this inquiry is a consideration of whether the plaintiff sincerely holds the beliefs.3 ' Notably, the
sincerity of the plaintiff's beliefs is often not disputed by the parties
because the government normally stipulates that the plaintiff's beliefs
are sincere." In the rare instances in which the parties dispute the
plaintiff's sincerity, there is no judicial determination regarding whether
his or her religious beliefs are in fact true because such a question is
beyond the powers of the court.' Rather, the focus of the analysis is
whether the plaintiff appears to believe what he or she professes to
believe."4 The plaintiff may prove this by explaining the precepts of his
or her professed faith and demonstrating that he or she follows its
mandates in his or her daily life.35
Once the plaintiff plausibly asserts the sincerity of his or her religious
beliefs (or the sincerity is stipulated by the government), the plaintiff
must then prove that the challenged law causes a substantial burden on
his or her free exercise of religion. The plaintiff may prove this by
demonstrating either of the following: (1) the challenged law pressures
him or her to violate his or her religious beliefs in order to obtain an

26.

See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713-14

(1981).
27. See id. at 717-18.
28. See id. at 714-16.
29. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1123 (8th Cir. 1984), af'dpercuriamsub nom.
Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985).
30. Id. (citation omitted).
31. See id. at 1125.
32. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 531; Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399 n.1.
33. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990)
(quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)), superseded by 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (2006); see also Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1125 (citing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16).
34. See Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1125.
35. See id. ("Because Quaring's beliefs are based on a passage from scripture, receive
some support from historical and biblical tradition, and play a central role in her daily life,
they must be characterized as sincerely held religious beliefs.").
36. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
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important state benefit,3 7 or (2) the challenged law compels the plaintiff
to violate his or her religious beliefs.3" An example of a challenged law
pressuring one to violate his or her religion may be found in Sherbert.
The plaintiff in Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist
Church, satisfied her burden by proving that the state statute setting
forth the eligibility requirements for unemployment compensation forced
her to choose between receiving the government benefit or violating her
religious belief regarding the acceptability of Saturday work.39
Although the state statute did not compel the plaintiff to forego her
Saturday worship, the Court stated that the resultant ineligibility for
unemployment compensation pressured the plaintiff to violate her
religious belief.' An example of a challenged law compelling one to
violate his or her religion may be found in Wisconsin v.Yoder. 4 In
Yoder members of the Amish religion satisfied their burden by proving
that the state statute requiring children to attend school until reaching
the age of sixteen compelled them, under the threat of criminal sanction,
to violate their religious belief prohibiting formal education beyond the
eighth grade.4" The Court held that the state statute forced the
individuals to violate their religious belief43 because failure to follow
the statute would have resulted in a fine, imprisonment, or both a fine
and imprisonment."
After the plaintiff satisfactorily makes his or her showing, the
challenged law may nonetheless be upheld if the government proves the
following: (1) the government has a compelling interest that the
challenged law achieves, and (2) there are no adequate alternatives that
would minimize the intrusion into the plaintiff's free exercise of his or
her religion.4' To satisfy its burden of proof, the government cannot
merely assert that it has an interest in what the challenged law
regulates.4 6 Rather, the government must set forth a compelling

37. Id.
38. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.

39.
40.
41.
42.

374 U.S. at 399-401, 403-04.
Id. at 403-04.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 207-08, 218. In Yoder the school district administrator for the public school

brought suit against the Amish individuals for violating the state statute. Id. at 207-08.

Thus, the individuals claiming constitutional protection in Yoder were defendants rather
than plaintiffs. See id.
43. Id. at 218.
44. Id. at 207 n.2 (citing WIs. STAT. § 118.15(5) (1969) (current version at WIS. STAT.
ANN.§ 118.15 (2004 & Supp. 2006))).
45. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
46. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
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interest, which is limited to those instances when "[tihe conduct or
actions so regulated... pose[l some substantial threat to public safety,
peace[,] or order."47 Furthermore, the government must prove that the
compelling government interest cannot be achieved by any alternative
that would create less of a burden on the plaintiff's free exercise of
religion than does the challenged law.48 As shown by the heavy burden
of proof the government bears, the strict scrutiny test is supposed to set
an extremely high standard by which laws allegedly violating the Free
Exercise Clause are judged.

2. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith: Application of the Strict Scrutiny Test and the
Rational Basis Test. Despite the stringent requirements of the strict
scrutiny test, the Court invalidated few laws under this standard in the
years following its enunciation.4 9 In fact, in some cases, the Court even
expressly rejected the strict scrutiny test and applied a lower standard.50 For example, in Bowen v. Roy, 5 the Court considered the
constitutionality of two federal statutes that conditioned the receipt of
government benefits on whether applicants provided the Social Security
numbers for the members of their households.5 2 The government
planned to use the Social Security numbers in the administration of the
benefit plan.53 The plaintiffs, who were Native Americans, alleged that
the governmental use of a unique identifier, such as a Social Security
number, for their child would "rob the [child's] spirit."54 Despite the
plaintiffs' religious concerns, the Court applied a standard lower than
the strict scrutiny test because the challenged statutes were neutral and
generally applied to the public.55 The Court upheld the challenged
statutes after concluding that they were enacted for the legitimate
government interest of preventing fraud and were a reasonable means
of achieving that goal.56

47.

Id. at 403.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 407.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 21, at 1248.
See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707-08 (1986).
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
Id. at 695.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 696 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 707-12.
Id. at 709-12.
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In accordance with the already prevailing trend, the Court explicitly
limited the application of the strict scrutiny test in 1990. 57 During that

year, the Court in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith 5s held that the right to free exercise of
religion does not insulate one from following neutral statutes that are
generally applied to the public. 9 Rather, in such a situation, the
applicable test is the rational basis test, which has notably less stringent
requirements than those required by the strict scrutiny test." Namely,
under the rational basis test, a challenged law that is both neutral and
generally applicable will be upheld even if it substantially burdens the
free exercise of religion so long as the government proves the following:
(1) the government has a legitimate interest, and (2) the challenged
statute is a reasonable way of achieving the interest.6
The strict scrutiny test, however, has not been completely eliminated.
This is because the strict scrutiny test applies when a statute is not
neutral or not generally applicable.6 2 Under the strict scrutiny test, a
challenged law that is not neutral or not generally applicable and that
substantially burdens the free exercise of religion will be upheld only if
the government proves the following: (1) the government has a
compelling interest that the challenged law achieves, and (2) there are
no adequate alternatives that would minimize the intrusion into the
plaintiff's free exercise of religion."' Due to the stringency of this test,
a law that is not both neutral and generally applicable rarely will be
upheld.'
Importantly, the issues of whether the challenged law is
neutral and whether it is generally applied to the public are connected."5 Therefore, answering one of these issues may help answer the
other issue."
When determining whether the challenged law is neutral, the relevant
question is whether the law purposefully targets religious practices

57. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940),
overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).

58. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
59. Id. at 879, 881-82.
60.

See Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 531 (citing Smith, 494 U.S.

872).
61. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 707-08. The court in Smith, however, identified some
exceptions to this rule. 494 U.S. at 881-82, 884 (referring to the hybrid right exception
and the individualized exemption exception).

62. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 546.
63. See id. (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)).
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 531.
See id.
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borne from religious beliefs. 7 A law can target religious beliefs in one
of two ways. First, the text of the statute may be explicitly directed at
religious beliefs.'
This occurs when the statute uses words with
religious connotations, and the statute's text or context eliminates the
application of possible secular meanings.6 9 Second, the text of the
statute may be neutral, but the legislature may nonetheless design the
statute to target religious beliefs.70 When considering what the
legislature designed the statute to accomplish, the statute's effect is
strong evidence of what the legislature intended; however, it is not
determinative. 71 For example, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah,72 the Court determined that the city ordinances
concerning religious animal sacrifices targeted Santeria sacrifices
because, with their numerous exceptions, the only conduct subject to the
ordinances was the practices of the Santeria church.73
When determining whether the challenged law is generally applicable,
the relevant inquiry is not whether the law is applied to the public at
large. 74 Such a requirement would be unreasonably broad and would
fail to recognize the fact that "[a]ll laws are selective to some extent."7"
Rather, the applicability requirement provides that the "government, in
pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective 7manner impose
burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief." 1
As a result of Smith, the answer to these two related issues-neutrality and applicability-determines whether the strict
scrutiny test or the rational basis test applies when analyzing the
constitutionality of a challenged law.7 7 The appropriate level of
constitutional scrutiny determines whether the statute is constitutional
and thus should either be upheld or invalidated.78
3. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993: Congress's
Response to Smith. In Smith the Court stated that the threshold
question for determining what standard to apply to a law allegedly

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 533.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 534-35.
Id. at 535.
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Id. at 542.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 543.
See id. at 546; Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 546.
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violating the Free Exercise Clause was whether the challenged law was
both neutral and generally applicable. 9 If this question was answered
in the affirmative, then the challenged law was upheld so long as it
satisfied the rational basis test." In response to Smith, Congress
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).81 The
RFRA's stated purpose is "to restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert ... and to guarantee its application in all cases [in
which] free exercise of religion is substantially burdened."82 Thus,
Congress legislatively changed the threshold question in the inquiry and
made it whether the challenged law substantially burdens the free
exercise of religion.'
If such a burden is in fact found, then the
challenged law is upheld only if the strict scrutiny standard is met.'
When the RFRA was enacted, it had extensive coverage. First, the
RFRA's analytic framework applied to challenged federal, state, and
local laws.'
Second, the RFRA applied to all subject matters.'
Third, the RFRA applied to all laws, regardless of when the challenged
law was enacted.
As a result, under the RFRA, "[amny law [was]
subject to challenge at any time by any individual who allege[d] a
substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion."88
4. City ofBoerne v. Flores:Judicial Limitation on the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The RFRA was not in effect long
before it was challenged. In City of Boerne v. Flores,9 the Court held
that the RFRA is unconstitutional as it applies to state laws. 90 In
concluding this, the Court reasoned that the RFRA exceeds Congress's
power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the constitutional
guarantees of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 9'
Notably, Flores declares that the RFRA is unconstitutional only as it

79. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
80. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 531.
81. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (emphasis added).

83. Id.
84. See id.
85. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1)).
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a)).

88. Id.
89. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
90. Id. at 535-36.
91. U.S. CONST. amend XIV; Flores, 521 U.S. at 536.

20101

PHOTOGRAPHREQUIREMENT

applies to challenged state laws.92 As a result, it appears as though the
RFRA remains good law when a federal law is challenged.9 3
5. State RFRAs and State Constitutional Provisions: The
States' Responses to Flores. In response to Flores, some state
legislatures enacted their own religious freedom and restoration acts or
amended their state constitutions to provide for the exclusive use of the
strict scrutiny test." For example, a portion of Florida's Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 199895 states:
The government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that government may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person: (a) [ius in furtherance of a compelling government
interest; and (b) [ius the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest."
Consequently, Florida and other states whose legislatures responded to
Flores in a similar manner use the strict scrutiny test even when the
text of the challenged statute is neutral and generally applicable, so long
as the statute substantially burdens the free exercise of one's religion. 97
As shown by this explanation, the evolution of the proper test for free
exercise challenges is rather complex. However, it is important to note
the level of constitutional scrutiny the various courts use in making
decisions because whether plaintiffs satisfactorily make the requisite
showing ultimately depends on the applicable scrutiny level.
II.

CASES ADDRESSING THE PHOTOGRAPH REQUIREMENT FOR DRIVERS'
LICENSES

Adhering to the appropriate levels of constitutional scrutiny for the
relevant time period and jurisdiction, various courts throughout the
United States have considered whether the photograph requirement
violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United

92. Caroline E. Kuerschner, Comment, Our Vulnerable ConstitutionalRights: The
Supreme Court'sRestriction of Congress' Enforcement Powers in City of Boerne v. Flores,
78 OR. L. REv. 551, 557 n.42 (1999).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Freeman v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48, 53
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
95. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01-.05 (West 2005).
96. Id. § 761.03(1).
97. See id.
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States Constitution." When a court determines whether to uphold the
challenged statute, the context in which the case is decided appears to
be of extreme importance in explaining the government's interest and
whether such interest is sufficient to allow an intrusion into the
plaintiff's free exercise of religion.
A.

Pre-Smith Cases

1. Limiting the State's Interest to Identifying Licensed Drivers
During Traffic Stops. In Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal
House. of Prayer,Inc.," the Indiana Supreme Court applied the strict
scrutiny test and considered whether the photograph requirement of the
state statute violated the free exercise of religion, as asserted by the
Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc. (PHPI) and the National Committee
for Amish Religious Freedoms (NCARF).' °
The relevant statute,
Indiana Code § 9-1-4-37(b), 11 stated, "Every... permit or license ...
shall contain the name, age, residence address, a brief description, and,
with the exception of a learner's permit, a photograph of such person for
the purpose of identification ....
Both religious groups involved in the case followed a literal reading of
the Bible." °
Importantly, the Second Commandment states, "Thou
shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing
that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the
water under the earth.""° Because the Second Commandment forbids
the making of "graven images," these religious groups believed that their
faiths prohibited them from posing for photographs, including those
statutorily required on drivers' licenses. 105
As a result of this belief, the religious groups claimed that the
photograph requirement forced their members to choose between

98.

U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984),

affd per curiam sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985); Dennis v. Charnes
(DennisII), 646 F. Supp. 158 (D. Colo. 1986); Valov v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 34 Cal. Rptr.
3d 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep't of Revenue, 593 P.2d
1363 (Colo. 1979) (en banc); Freeman v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So.

2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer,
Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. 1978).
99. 380 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. 1978).
100. Id. at 1226, 1228.
101. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-1-4-37(b) (LexisNexis 1976 & Supp. 1978) (current version at
IND. CODE ANN. § 9-24-11-5 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2008)).

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
PentecostalHouse of Prayer,Inc., 380 N.E.2d at 1226.
Exodus 20:4 (King James); accord Deuteronomy 5:8 (King James).
PentecostalHouse of Prayer,Inc., 380 N.E.2d at 1226.
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obtaining a valid driver's license and following an important religious
mandate. Due to this nearly impossible decision, the PHPI brought suit
against the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, seeking (1) a declaration that the
photograph requirement was unconstitutional when applied to its church
members and (2) an enjoinment prohibiting the bureau from enforcing
the photograph requirement against its church members. The trial court
allowed the NCARF to intervene in the action because the bureau had
revoked an exception to the photograph requirement that it had
previously granted to the Beachy Amish sect. In responding to the suit,
the bureau did not contest the sincerity of the religious groups' beliefs
regarding the biblical prohibition against photographs. Rather, the
bureau contended that the photograph requirement aided the state in
identifying licensed drivers and that the state's interest in identification
should prevail over the religious groups' constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion.'0 8
In deciding this case, the court considered the bureau's contention that
the photograph requirement helped to ensure that state roads were safe
by enabling the quick and accurate identification of licensed individuals."°7 Even though the court noted that there is a greater likelihood
of the state's interest prevailing over the individual's interest when the
state's interest concerns the public welfare,' 8 it nevertheless affirmed
the lower court's decision and held that the photograph requirement was
unconstitutional.'0 9 In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned
that the state's interest in identifying licensed drivers was not a
compelling interest and that the interest could be achieved by other
means that do not intrude onto the religious groups' free exercise of
religion."0
For instance, the court explained that the statistics
concerning a licensee's physical appearance, which are usually included
on a driver's license, would achieve the same end as the photograph
requirement."'
2. Extending the State Interest to Identification in Numerous
Other Situations. In Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Division, Department
of Revenue,"' the Colorado Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny
test and considered whether the photograph requirement of a state

106. Id. at 1226-27.

107. Id. at 1229.
108. Id. at 1228.
109. Id. at 1229.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.

112.

593 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
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statute violated the free exercise of religion, as asserted by members of
the Assembly of YHWHHOSHUA."' The statute in question, Colorado
Revised Statutes § 42-2-106(3),"" stated, "Every application for a
driver's, minor driver's, or provisional driver's license, and the license
issued as a result of said application,
shall ... contain the photograph
11 5
of the applicant or licensee."
Like the plaintiffs in Pentecostal House of Prayer,Inc., the plaintiffs
in Johnson followed a literal reading of the Bible and believed that the
Second Commandment prohibited them from posing for any photographs.
Because they refused to be photographed, the Motor Vehicle Division of
the Department of Revenue would not issue them drivers' licenses even
though they were otherwise eligible. Accordingly, the plaintiffs brought
suit against the department, seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the
photograph requirement was unconstitutional as applied to them and (2)
injunctive
relief invalidating the photograph requirement in regards to
116
them.

Like the defendant in Pentecostal House of Prayer,Inc., the department did not contest the sincerity of the plaintiffs' beliefs regarding the
biblical prohibition against photographs. Additionally, the department
did not contest the plaintiffs' assertion that the photograph requirement
intruded into their free exercise of religion. Instead, the department
contended that the state's interest in identification was compelling and
could not be achieved by alternative means that lessened the intrusion
into the plaintiffs' free exercise of religion. 1
In deciding this case, the court was persuaded by the department's
argument concerning the importance of the photograph requirement for
identification purposes."' Namely, the department stated that the
photographs on drivers' licenses were relevant in numerous situations
other than the identification of drivers during traffic stops. For example,
the photographs (whose negatives the department stored) were used
when police photographic lineups were conducted and when a victim's
identity at an accident had to be ascertained." 9 Due to these instances, the court declared that the state's interest was compelling. 2 °
Additionally, the court believed that providing any exception to the

113. Id. at 1363-65.
114. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-106(3) (1973) (current version at CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-2-107 (2006)).
115. Id.

116. Johnson, 593 P.2d at 1363-64.
117.

Id. at 1364-65.

118. Id. at 1365-66.
119.

Id. at 1365.

120. Id.
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photograph requirement, including one to the plaintiffs, would prevent
the state from achieving the important identification purpose served by
drivers' licenses.121 As a result, the court affirmed the lower court's
decision
and held that the photograph requirement was constitution2
al.

12

3. Recognizing the Impact of Other Exceptions. In contrast to
the groups of plaintiffs involved in the two previous cases, in Quaringv.
Peterson,"2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
applied the strict scrutiny test and considered whether the photograph
requirement of the state statute violated the free exercise of religion, as
asserted by an individual plaintiff."2 The state statute required that
drivers' licenses contain photographs of those who were licensed;
however, there were numerous exceptions to the photograph require25
ment. 1
Frances Quaring, the plaintiff in this case, wanted an exception to be
extended to herself. She refused to be photographed, claiming that she
adhered to a literal interpretation of the Bible and that posing for
photographs was against her personal religious convictions (even though
others in the church she attended did not share this belief). Solely
because of her refusal to be photographed, officials from the Nebraska
Department of Motor Vehicles denied her application. Following the
denial, Quaring brought suit against the officials, seeking
a court order
126
requiring the issuance of a valid driver's license to her.
As in the two previous cases, the officials did not contest the sincerity
of Quaring's personal religious beliefs. Instead, the officials asserted the
following: (1) the photograph requirement did not burden Quaring's free
exercise of religion; (2) even if that was not the case, the state's interests
should prevail over Quaring's right to the free exercise of religion; and
(3) there were no alternatives that would be less restrictive of Quaring's
free exercise of religion and achieve the same end as the photograph
requirement.' 27
Even though the officials did not contest the religious nature of
Quaring's beliefs, the court noted that Quaring's beliefs were unusual in

121.

Id.

122. Id. at 1366.
123. 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984). An equally divided United States Supreme Court
affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision without opinion. Jensen, 472 U.S. at 478.
124. Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1122, 1126-27.
125. Id. at 1122.
126. Id. at 1122-23.
127. Id. at 1122.

626

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

modern society.128 Nevertheless, beliefs need not be held by society at
large or by all members of a certain religious sect to be considered
religious and thus given constitutional protection."' s Therefore, the
court stated that it would not let the unusual nature of Quaring's beliefs
influence its decision because they were her personal religious convictions. 3 °
After noting this, the court then discussed its conclusion regarding the
first two contentions made by the officials.' 3 ' First, the court concluded that the photograph requirement burdened Quaring's free exercise of
religion." 2 The court reasoned that the photograph requirement forced
Quaring to choose between following her religious convictions and being
granted an important state benefit.13 Second, the court concluded
that Quaring's interest in the free exercise of religion outweighed the
state's combined interests of (1) protecting the public safety by ensuring
that only licensed drivers operate vehicles, (2) facilitating the identification of people in financial transactions, and (3) avoiding the administrative burden of considering applications from those seeking exceptions
from the photograph requirement due to their religious beliefs.' 3'
While making its determination, the court considered whether granting
Quaring an exception to the photograph requirement would impair the
state's interests.13' Notably, the state already permitted numerous
exceptions to the photograph requirement, including "learner's permits,
school permits issued to farmers' children, farm machinery permits,
special permits for those with restricted or minimal driving ability, [and]
temporary licenses for individuals outside the state whose old licenses
[had] expired."" 6 Based in part on the existence of the other exceptions to the photograph requirement, the court believed that the state's
interests would not be further frustrated by the granting of an exception
based on one's religious aversion to having his or her photograph

128. Id. at 1123.
129. Id. at 1124-25 (citing Thomas v. Review Rd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981)).

130. Id. at 1125.
131. See id. at 1125-27. The majority did not discuss whether there were alternatives
that would be less restrictive of Quaring's free exercise of religion and achieve the same
end as the photograph requirement. See id. This omission in the majority's analysis was
noted by the dissent. Id. at 1128 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1125 (majority).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1126-27.
135. Id. at 1126 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
136. Id.
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taken. 37 Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's order exempting Quaring from the photograph requirement and requiring the officials
to issue her a valid driver's license. 3
In Dennis v. Charnes,'3 9 the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado applied the strict scrutiny test and considered
whether the photograph requirement of the state statute violated the
free exercise of religion as asserted by William Dennis, a member of the
Assembly of YHWHHOSHUA. 40 The state statute, Colorado Revised
Statutes § 42-2-112(1),141 stated that drivers' licenses "shall bear
thereon a photograph of the licensee."142
Like the plaintiffs in the earlier cases, Dennis believed that the
Second Commandment prohibited him from posing for any photographs.
Because Dennis refused to be photographed, Alan Charnes, the director
of revenue for the State of Colorado, would not issue him a driver's
license. As a result, Dennis brought suit against Charnes and the State
of Colorado, seeking a court order requiring the issuance of a valid
driver's license to him. In response to the suit, the defendants did not
contest the fact that the photograph requirement burdened Dennis's free
exercise of religion. Rather, the defendants alleged that the state's
interest 143in the identification of drivers during traffic stops should
prevail.
When it first heard the case, the district court relied on the Colorado
Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson because there were no relevant
federal cases at that time.' 4 As in Johnson, the district court dismissed this case because it believed that the identification purpose
drivers' licenses served was a compelling state interest that could not be
achieved5 by less burdensome alternatives, such as the use of finger14
prints.

However, the Eighth Circuit issued its opinion in Quaring while
Dennis's appeal of his case's dismissal was pending. 146 Due to the
decision in favor of the plaintiff in Quaring,the United States Court of

137. Id. at 1126-27.
138. Id. at 1128.
139. Dennis II, 646 F. Supp. 158 (D. Colo. 1986).
140. Id. at 159, 163-64.
141. COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-112(1) (1973) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-2-114(1)(a)(III)(A) (West 2006)).
142. Id.
143. Dennis II, 646 F. Supp. at 159-61.
144. Id. at 161 n.2 (citing Johnson, 593 P.2d 1363).
145. Dennis v. Charnes (Dennis 1), 571 F. Supp. 462, 464 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd, Dennis
11, 805 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1984).
146. Dennis 1, 646 F. Supp. at 161 n.2 (citing Quaring, 728 F.2d 1121).
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Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Dennis's complaint may have
stated a cause of action against the defendants.14 7 Because of the lack
of information about the various exceptions to the state statute, the
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the case and
remanded the case to be reconsidered by the district court.14 8
When it again heard the case, the district court considered the
exceptions to the state statute.1 49 In certain circumstances, the state
issued special drivers' licenses for short periods of time that did not
require photographs to be placed on the drivers' licenses. For example,
those circumstances included when an individual was suspected of drunk
driving and either refused to take or failed the alcohol intoxication test,
when one accumulated too many points on the regular driver's license
and was issued a probationary driver's license, and when one was
beginning to learn how to drive. When one of these circumstances
applied, the licensing agency took a photograph of the driver and placed
the photograph in the agency's files. However, because the licensees'
photographs were not on the special drivers' licenses, they did not serve
the instantaneous identification purpose as did regular drivers'
licenses. 5 '
In reconsidering its initial decision, the district court paid heed to
what the Tenth Circuit suggested and considered the impact of Quaring
on this case. 5 ' Notably, the district court stated, "The district court
decision in Quaring v. Peterson appears to be indistinguishable." 52 As
a result, the district court exempted Dennis from the photograph
requirement and ordered that the defendants issue him a valid driver's
license if he was otherwise qualified. 5 While explaining its reasoning
for this conclusion, the district court stated that the filed photographs
for special drivers' licenses did not serve a useful identification purpose
for drivers during traffic stops because law enforcement would not likely
access the filed photographs at the relevant time.'5 4 Additionally, the
court noted the irony in the fact that the drivers who were issued special
drivers' licenses (suspected drunk drivers, drivers on probation, and
inexperienced drivers) were the types of drivers for whom the identification purpose would have been the most useful.'5 5 As such, the district
147. Dennis 1, 805 F.2d at 340 (citing Quaring, 728 F.2d 1121).
148. Id.
149. See Dennis 11, 646 F. Supp. at 161-62.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 161 n.2, 162-64 (citing Quaring, 728 F.2d 1121).
152. Id. at 162 (citation omitted) (citing Quaring, 728 F.2d 1121).
153. Id. at 164.
154. Id. at 163.

155. Id.
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court found that the state's interest in instantaneous identification was
not so compelling that exceptions could not be granted to those seeking
them on religious grounds. 5 '
B.

Post-Smith Cases

1. Focusing on the Recent Terrorism Concerns. In Valov v.
Department of Motor Vehicles,'57 the Court of Appeals for the Second
District of California considered whether the photograph requirement of
two state statutes violated the free exercise of religion, as asserted by
Jack Valov, a member of the Molokan religious faith.5 8 In this case,
the following statutes were in question: California Vehicle Code
§ 12811(a)(1)(A), 159 which states that drivers' licenses shall have an
"engraved picture or photograph of the licensee for the purpose of identification,""6 and California Vehicle Code § 12800.5(a)(1), 161 which
states that "[a] license shall bear a fullface engraved picture or
photograph of the licensee." 11 2 Unlike some of the challenged statutes
in earlier cases, California's Vehicle Code did not provide for any
exceptions to the photograph requirement.6 3
Similar to the plaintiffs in earlier cases, Valov followed a literal
interpretation of the Bible and believed that the Second Commandment
prohibited him from posing for any photographs. Due to his religious
beliefs, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) previously granted
Valov an exception from the photograph requirement. However, the
DMV refused to continue the exception when Valov's driver's license was
up for renewal in 2003."64 The DMV alleged that the revocation of the
exception was justified "in the interest of national security and to
prevent identity theft." 165 Because of the DMV's revocation of his
previously granted exception, Valov brought suit against the DMV for
violating the United States Constitution and the California Constitution.
For his requested remedy, Valov sought a court order requiring the
renewal of his driver's license. 6

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 176.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 12811(a)(1)(A) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010).
Id.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 12800.5(a)(1) (West 2000).
Id.

163. Valov, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 181.
164. Id. at 176.
165. Id. at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Id. at 176.
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In response to Valov's suit, Joe Barnett, special advisor/consultant to
the director of the DMV, made a declaration regarding the numerous
state interests the photograph requirement served.
Namely, the
photographs were used for the following purposes: (1) to encourage the
safety of the vehicle in question, other vehicles on the highway, and law
enforcement officers; (2) to deter fraudulent activities; (3) to prevent
identity theft; and (4) to aid in combating terrorism. For example, law
enforcement officers used the photographs to quickly and precisely
identify drivers while making traffic stops. Also, DMV employees used
the photographs when issuing duplicate drivers' licenses and identification cards to prevent the issuance of these documents to the wrong
people. Additionally, businesses used the photographs when transacting
with customers. Moreover, federal authorities used the photographs in
their efforts to aid airport security. Therefore, Barnett claimed that the
photograph requirement served a number of identification purposes that
promoted public safety.167
While analyzing what standard to follow for the alleged violation of
the United States Constitution, the court concluded that the photograph
requirement was neutral and generally applied to anyone who sought a
driver's license." The court reached this decision because the statutes
were facially neutral and were not designed to target religious practices.' 69 As such, the court followed the rational basis test and considered whether the state had a legitimate interest and whether the
challenged statutes were a reasonable way to achieve the state's
interest. 7 °
In making this determination, the court accepted the state's interests
put forth in Barnett's declaration and assuredly stated that the
challenged statutes provided a reasonable way of achieving these
identification purposes.'71 Because the statutes satisfied the rational
basis test, the court denied Valov's claim concerning the alleged violation
of the United States Constitution even though the photograph requirement substantially burdened his religious beliefs.' 72
Importantly, while analyzing the alleged violation of the California
Constitution, the court considered whether the challenged statutes
survived the strict scrutiny test (and thus the rational basis test as

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

177-78.
179-80.
180.
179-80.

172. Id. at 183.
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well).173 The court considered both of these levels of constitutional
scrutiny because the California Supreme Court had previously decided
a case that "left open the question of whether California's free17 4exercise
clause required strict scrutiny or some other level of review."
In its analysis, the court distinguished the case at hand with similar
cases decided in other jurisdictions prior to September 11, 2001.17r For
example, the court specifically rejected the Indiana Supreme Court's
assertion in Pentecostal House of Prayer,Inc. that statistics concerning
a licensee's physical appearance, which are usually included on a driver's
license, would achieve the same end as the photograph requirement. 176
Rather, the court agreed with the DMV that photographs provide the
quickest and most precise way for law enforcement to identify people
while out in the field. 177 Also, the court refused to follow the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Quaring,which held that the state did not have a
compelling interest in identification. 178 The court distinguished this
case from Quaring,in part, because in Quaringthe Eighth Circuit "had
no occasion to assess whether contemporary counterterrorism concerns
justified the refusal to accommodate religious objections to identifying
photographs."' 79 Moreover, the court distinguished this case from
Quaringand Dennis because the challenged statutes in this case did not
allow for any exceptions, unlike the statutes in the earlier cases.1
Therefore, the court denied Valov's claim concerning the alleged violation
of the California Constitution, regardless of whether the alleged
infringement was to be evaluated under the strict scrutiny test or the
more lenient rational basis test.'
2. Analyzing the Photograph Requirement as Applied to Veiled
Muslim Women. In Freeman v. Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles,"5 2 the District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Fifth
District considered how the photograph requirement of the state statute

173.

See id. at 183-88.

174. Id. at 183 (citing Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d
67 (Cal. 2004)).

175. See id. at 186-87 (discussing Quaring, 728 F.2d 1121; PentecostalHouse ofPrayer,
Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1225).
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 187 (citing PentecostalHouse of Prayer,Inc., 380 N.E.2d at 1229).
Id.
Id. (citing Quaring,728 F.2d at 1126).
Id.
Id. (citing Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1127; Dennis II, 646 F. Supp. at 162).

181. Id. at 187-88.
182. 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), affg Freeman v. State, No. 2002-CA-2828,
2003 WL 21338619 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 6, 2003).
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applied to Sultaana Lakiana Myke Freeman, a veiled Muslim woman. 1' The relevant state statutes were the following: Florida Statutes
§ 322.14(1)(a),1 " which states, "a driver's license... shall bear thereon
a color photograph or digital image of the licensee,"" and Florida
Statutes § 322.142(1)," which states, "a color photographic or digital
imaged driver's license [shall] bear[] a fullface photograph or digital
image of the licensee."'
However, the photograph requirement was
not absolute because Florida allowed exceptions for some temporary
driving permits and replacement drivers' licenses."
After studying the Qur'an and Sunnah, Freeman began regularly
wearing a traditional Muslim headdress that included a veil. 89 The
veil covered Freeman's entire face with the exception of a slit in the
fabric for her eyes. She wore the veil while around strangers and
Muslim men who were not part of her family." ° As such, Freeman
wore the veil when she went to the Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles to be photographed for her driver's license. Initially, the
department allowed Freeman to be photographed while wearing the veil.
However, the department notified Freeman ten months later that her
license would be revoked if she did not take another photograph while
not wearing the veil.' 9 ' Freeman "firmly believe[d] that Islam mandate[d] that she wear the veil in situations such as... the taking of a
photograph." 92 Because Freeman would only be photographed while
wearing the veil, the department revoked her driver's license.'9 3
Freeman brought suit against the department, claiming that the
department violated the Florida Constitution as well as Florida's
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998 (FRFRA).'" Namely,
Freeman claimed that the state singled her out due to her Islamic

183. Freeman, 924 So. 2d 48 at 50-51.
184. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.14(1)(a) (West 2001) (current version at FA. STAT. ANN.
§ 322.14(1Xa) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010)).
185. Id.
186. FA.STAT. ANN. § 322.142(1) (West 2001) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 322.142(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010)).
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188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *6.
Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 51.
Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *1.
Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 51-52.
Id. at 52.
Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *1.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01-.05 (West 2005); Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 50-51.
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faith.195 As relief, Freeman requested that the court order the department to reinstate her driver's license. 19
The Florida Circuit Court for the Ninth Judicial Circuit applied the
strict scrutiny test to the alleged violation of the Florida Constitution. 1 9 7 While considering the state's interest, the trial court explained
that it "agree[d] with the [s]tate that today it is a different world than
it was 20-25 years ago. It would be foolish not to recognize that there
are new threats to public safety, including both foreign and domestic
terrorism, and increased potential for 'widespread abuse .
Based on this reasoning, the trial court held that the state's interest in
instantaneous identification had to prevail over Freeman's right to the
free exercise of religion. In making its decision, the trial court noted
that it was not influenced by the fact that Freeman was Muslim. In
fact, the trial court claimed that it would have reached the same decision
for anyone, regardless of religion, who wished to cover his or her face
with the exception of his or her eyes.' 99
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Fifth District
applied the strict scrutiny test (with a modified definition of substantial
burden) to the alleged violation of the FRFRA.200 The FRFRA utilizes
the strict scrutiny test even when the text of the statute is neutral and
generally applicable, so long as the statute substantially burdens the
religious adherent's free exercise of his or her religion.2"' Under the
FRFRA, the definition of substantial burden is restricted.2 2 In fact,
substantialburden is limited to those situations in which a law "'either
compels the religious adherent to engage in conduct that his religion
forbids or
forbids him to engage in conduct that his religion re20
quires.' , 3
At trial, both the department and Freeman presented expert witnesses
who testified about the practice of Muslim women veiling their faces.
The department's expert witness, Dr. El Fadl, testified that the primary
purpose behind the veiling practice was to avoid arousing sexual desires
in men. Also, Fadl testified that the Islamic faith allowed certain

195. Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *6. Notably, the department contacted Freeman
to retake her photograph three months after September 11, 2001. Freeman, 924 So. 2d at
51-52.
196. Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *1.
197. See id. at *4-7.
198. Id. at *7 (discussing Pentecostal House of Prayer,Inc., 380 N.E.2d at 1229).
199. Id.
200. See Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 52-57.
201. Id. at 55 (citing Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023, 1032 (Fla. 2004)).
202. Id. at 55-56 (citing Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1033).
203. Id. (quoting Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1033).
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exceptions to the veiling practice that arose out of necessity.2" For
example, those exceptions included "medical necessity, identification for
burial purposes, identification for purposes of receiving bequests or
inheritance, and identification for the purpose of writing wills to be
accepted by a judge."2"'
Additionally, women were required to be
photographed without veils in Saudi Arabia, a country heavily populated
by Muslims, for the purposes of creating passports and taking examinations. Because of the presence of these exceptions, Fadl believed that a
Muslim woman could momentarily remove her veil and thus comply with
the photograph requirement without violating her religious beliefs by
having the photograph taken by a female employee at a time when no
men were around.2°6 In fact, the department had previously followed
this practice for several other Muslim women who were regularly
veiled.20 7 Based on Fadl's testimony, the court held that no substantial burden on Freeman's religion existed because the Islamic faith did
not forbid Freeman from having her photograph taken without the
veil.2" 8 As a result, the court denied Freeman the requested relief."'°
III.

ANALYSIS

Context is defined as "[tihe circumstances in which a particular event
occurs."21 '
In regards to context, the time period as well as the
geographical location in which something occurs appear to be especially
important in influencing the views of a group of people. As demonstrated by the reasoning of the courts in the cases discussed in Section II of
this Comment, judges appear to be no different in that their opinions are
shaped by the context in which they are formed. Namely, the context in
which a case is decided appears to be of extreme importance in
explaining the government's interest and whether the court considers
such interest to be sufficient to allow an intrusion into the plaintiff's free
exercise of religion.
A.

A Look at the Expanding List of Government Interests

Notably, as the years have progressed, the proponents of challenged
statutes have added to the list of government interests allegedly
supporting the validity of the photograph requirement. In Bureau of

204. Id. at 52.

205. Id.
206. Id.

207.
208.
209.
210.

Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *3.
Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 56-57.
Id. at 57.
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Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer,Inc.,211 decided in 1978,
the defendant argued that the state's interest was limited to identifying
licensed drivers during traffic stops. Namely, the defendant asserted
that the photograph requirement helped to ensure that state roads were
safe by enabling the quick and accurate identification of licensed
individuals.2 12 In Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Division, Department of
Revenue,21 decided in 1979, the defendant extended the state's interest
to identification in numerous situations other than the identification of
drivers during traffic stops. For example, the defendant noted that the
photographs were also used when police photographic lineups were
conducted and when a victim's identity at an accident had to be
ascertained. 14 In Quaring v. Peterson,215 decided in 1984, the defendants contended that the state's interests served by the photograph
requirement included protecting the public safety by ensuring that only
licensed drivers operate vehicles, facilitating the identification of people
in financial transactions, and avoiding the administrative burden of
considering applications from those seeking exceptions from the
photograph requirement due to their religious beliefs.2 16 In Freeman
v. State,2 17 decided in 2003, the defendant asserted that the state had
an interest in preventing both foreign and domestic terrorism.218
Finally, in Valov v. Department of Motor Vehicles,219 decided in 2005,
the defendant asserted that the state's interests served by the photograph requirement included encouraging the safety of the vehicle in
question, other vehicles on the highway, and law enforcement officers;
deterring fraudulent activities; preventing identity theft; and aiding in
the fight against terrorism.220 As shown by these cases, the government's alleged interest in the photograph requirement has expanded
over the past thirty years.

211. 380 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. 1978).
212. Id. at 1229.
213. 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
214. Id. at 1365.
215. 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), affd per curiam sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472
U.S. 478 (1985).
216. Id. at 1126-27.
217. No. 2002-CA-2828, 2003 WL 21338619 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 6, 2003), affd sub noam.
Freeman v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
218. Id. at *7.

219. 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
220. Id. at 178.
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B.

Tracing the Reasoning of the American Courts
Courts from various jurisdictions throughout the United States have
reasoned differently over the years when considering whether the
growing list of government interests allegedly supporting the validity of
the photograph requirement is sufficient to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
1. Initial Focus on the Number of Government Interests. Initially, courts were likely influenced by the number of
government interests allegedly supporting the validity of the photograph
requirement. In 1978 the Indiana Supreme Court in PentecostalHouse
of Prayer, Inc. applied the strict scrutiny test and held that the
photograph requirement was unconstitutional. 22 ' In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned that the only plausible state interest
allegedly justifying the photograph requirement-the state's interest in
identifying licensed divers-was not a compelling interest and that the
state interest could be achieved by other means that did not intrude into
the religious groups' free exercise of religion.2 2 For example, the court
believed that one alternative could be the use of the statistics concerning
the licensee's physical appearance, which are included on most drivers'
licenses.223 In contrast, in 1979 the Colorado Supreme Court in
Johnson applied the same test and held that the photograph requirement was constitutional.224 The court declared that the state's interest
in identification of people in numerous situations-including, among
others, traffic stops-was compelling.226
Additionally, the court
believed that providing any exception to the photograph requirement
would prevent the state from achieving the important identification
purpose served by drivers' licenses. 22 ' As shown by the courts' reasoning in these two early cases, the growing list of government interests
allegedly supporting the validity of the photograph requirement may
have influenced the courts' conclusions regarding the constitutionality
of the photograph requirement.
2. Consideration of Whether Others are Granted Exceptions. Following these initial cases, some courts were influenced by

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
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whether other groups of people were granted exceptions from the
photograph requirement when determining whether the state must grant
exceptions from the requirement to plaintiffs seeking them on religious
grounds. For example, in the 1984 case of Quaring,the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied the strict scrutiny test
and held that the individual plaintiff should be granted an exception
from the photograph requirement based in part on the existence of
various other exceptions.227
Those exceptions included "learner's
permits, school permits issued to farmers' children, farm machinery
permits, special permits for those with restricted or minimal driving
ability, [and] temporary licenses for individuals outside the state whose
old licenses [had] expired."22 Due to the exceptions to the photograph
requirement, the court believed that the granting of an exception based
on one's religious aversion to having his or her photograph taken would
not further frustrate the state's interest in identifying drivers, preventing fraud, and avoiding the administrative burden of considering
applications from those seeking exceptions due to religious reasons.229
23 °
Additionally, in the 1986 case of Dennis v. Charnes,
the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado applied the strict
scrutiny test and held that the individual plaintiff should be granted an
exception from the photograph requirement based in part on the
existence of several situations in which licensees' photographs were not
included on their special drivers' licenses.2 3' Such situations arose
when an individual was suspected of drunk driving and either refused
to take or failed the alcohol intoxication test, when one accumulated too
many points on the regular driver's license and was issued a probationary driver's license, and when one was beginning to learn how to
drive.232 Like the court in Quaring, the court in Dennis relied on the
other exceptions in determining that the granting of an exception to the
plaintiff would not further frustrate the state's interests.2 33 Therefore,
as demonstrated by both of these courts, the courts' decisions were
influenced by the fact that other groups of people were granted
exceptions from the photograph requirement.
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3. Emphasis on Recent Terrorism Concerns. Following the
United States Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,2 34 and despite
state responses to City of Boerne v. Flores235 providing for strict
scrutiny, no American court (as of the date of this Comment) has
granted an exception from the photograph requirement to an individual
or group seeking such an exception on religious grounds, even if
numerous exceptions are granted to others. Rather, the courts in the
most recent cases have emphasized the terrorism concerns that
Americans currently face. 2 6 In 2005 in Valov, the Court of Appeals
for the Second District of California applied the rational basis test and
held that the photograph requirement did not violate the United States
Constitution. 7 The court reasoned that the state had legitimate
interests in highway safety, fraud deterrence, identity theft prevention,
and the fight against terrorism and that the challenged statutes were a
reasonable way to achieve the state's interests."3 Additionally, the
court applied the strict scrutiny test and held that the photograph
requirement did not violate the California Constitution because the state
had a compelling interest in identification due to the newly developed
terrorism concerns, and the goals of this interest could not be achieved
by any other means that were less intrusive. 9 In 2003, much like the
court in Valov, the Florida Circuit Court for the Ninth Judicial Circuit
in Freemanapplied the strict scrutiny test and held that the photograph
requirement did not violate the United States Constitution because the
state had a compelling interest in identification due to both foreign and
domestic terrorism concerns.24 °
C. Contrastingthe Most Recent American Cases with a Recent
CanadianCase
The courts' reasoning in Valov and Freeman, the most recent
American cases, can be contrasted with the Supreme Court of Canada's
reasoning in the 2009 case of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson
Colony.2 'l
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In Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, the Hutterian Brethren
objected on religious grounds to the Province of Alberta's requirement
that all licensees have their photographs taken. The Province placed
these photographs in its facial recognition data bank to reduce instances
of identity theft through the issuance of multiple licenses to a single
person. 2
The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the
photograph requirement violated section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms,' which guarantees freedom of religion.'
The court concluded that the Province's goal of preventing identity theft
was pressing and substantial, 5 that the photograph requirement was
rationally related to this goal, 6 that the photograph requirement
minimally impaired the plaintiffs' freedom of religion," 7 and that the
intrusion into the plaintiffs' religious freedom was proportionate with the
benefits of the photograph requirement.2' 8 As such, the court held that
the photograph requirement was constitutional. 9
Comparing the Supreme Court of Canada's reasoning in this case with
the courts' reasoning in the two most recent American cases, it is
noticeable that the Canadian court did not mention any terrorism
concerns, whether foreign or domestic. 2 ' Rather, the Canadian court
focused only on the government's interest in identity theft prevention.251 In contrast, the courts in the two most recent American cases
2 2
discussed in detail the state's interest in the fight against terrorism.
In fact, the courts in these cases distinguish previous American cases
because the previous cases did not have occasion to consider the newly
developed terrorism concerns.2 53
Perhaps the courts in the two most recent American cases were
influenced by the terrorist attacks on the United States on September
11, 2001, which was a day that undoubtedly had a significant impact on
all Americans and continues to have such an impact over eight years
later. On that day, the false sense of an impenetrable national security
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system was devastatingly shattered. As a result of the attacks,
Americans have seen an increased emphasis on the tools used to aid
airport security and prevent future terrorist attacks. As demonstrated
by the two most recent American cases, this context has already
influenced and will continue to influence American courts. Even though
September 11, 2001, was a day that had an impact on the entire world,
Americans were particularly affected, as they were the target of the
attack. As a result, the opinions of American judges are understandably
more heavily influenced by these events than those of Canadian judges.
Therefore, it is not surprising that American judges appear to be more
willing to give adherence to the government interest of preventing future
terrorist attacks, which the photograph requirement allegedly serves.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In light of these new found public safety concerns, it appears as
though few, if any, statutes challenged in the United States after
September 11, 2001, for their photograph requirement will be declared
unconstitutional as impermissible intrusions into the plaintiffs' free
exercise of religion. As a result, the government can continue to
command that those desiring drivers' licenses say "Cheese!" and refuse
to grant exceptions to those who will not do so due to their religious
beliefs." 4
As shown by the two most recent American cases, the constitutionality
of this requirement can withstand not only the rational basis test but
also the strict scrutiny test.255 The state's interest in protecting its
inhabitants from terrorism is surely important. In fact, in Valov v.
Department of Motor Vehicles,25 6 the Court of Appeals for the Second
District of California held that such an interest was compelling.25 7
Additionally, the need for instantaneous identification cannot be
satisfactorily achieved by any current means other than a photograph.
For example, in Valov the court rejected the Indiana Supreme Court's

254. Additionally, it will be interesting to see how various courts throughout the United
States address plaintiffs who refuse to submit to the recent use of full-body scans prior to
boarding an airplane, due to religious objections to the use of "graven images." It is this
Author's opinion that courts will follow much the same analysis as that used for cases
addressing the photograph requirement. Namely, courts will emphasize the government's
interest in the prevention of future terrorist attacks.
255. See Valov v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 183, 187-88 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005); Freeman v. State, 2002-CA-2828, 2003 WL 21338619, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June
6, 2003), aff'd sub nom. Freeman v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d
48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
256. 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
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assertion in Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer,
Inc.25 that statistics concerning a licensee's physical appearance,
which are usually included on a driver's license, would suffice.259
As a result, it seems as though few exceptions to the photograph
requirement, if any, will be granted to plaintiffs seeking them in the
future on religious grounds. There appears to be a prevailing trend of
the government's interest in the benefits of the photograph requirement
outweighing the intrusion into the plaintiff's free exercise of religion.
This trend will likely be upset only if the context in which these cases
are decided also changes. It seems unimaginable that there will be
many events that will have as significant of an impact on the American
people-and the American courts-as that of September 11, 2001.
LAUREN N. HARRIS
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